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"RELIANCE" OR "COMMON
HONESTY OF SPEECH":
THE HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
2-313 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Charles A. Heckman *
Express warranties in the sale of goods are governed by section 2-313 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code This modern code section requires that an express affirma-
tion of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer must be a "basis of the
bargain" to become an express warranty. This "basis of the bargain" language intro-
duced a comcept much different from the pre-code requirement of reliance. Many
commentators and judges, however read the section 2-313 language as incorporating
the reliance requirement into the "basis of the bargain" analysis. This Article traces
the preliminary versions of the code and the writings of its principal drafts in an
attempt to uncover the meaning of the "basis of the bargain" concept. The author
persuasively argues that the drafts of section 2-313 intentionally rejected the reliance
requirement and in fact envisioned possible past-bargain warranties.
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 2-313 HAS BEEN one of the more controversial sec-
tions of the Uniform Commercial Code ever since the first defini-
tive version was published in 1950. Scholars and judges appear to
have been widely perplexed at the Code's creation of the term "basis
of the bargain,"' which was a concept that possessed no special
* Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law; A.B., Brown University
(1960); J.D., The University of Chicago (1964).
1. See, eg., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-4, at 332-39 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS]; I
STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, STUDY OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, at 392-93 (1955); Note, "Basis of the Bargain"-What
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meaning before the creation of this section. Section 2-313 reads in
part as follows:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of
the goods shall conform to the sample or model.2
The perplexity of the commentators and judges stems in part
from the pre-Code law of express warranty, section 12 of the Uni-
form Sales Act, which based warranty on the concept of "reliance."
Definition of Express Warranty. Any affirmation of fact or any
promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty
if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to in-
duce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases
the goods relying thereon. 3
The thesis of this Article is that the language of the U.C.C. can
be explained by tracing it back through the preliminary versions of
the Code and the work of its principal drafters, Chief Reporter Karl
Llewellyn and Assistant Reporter Soia Mentschikoff.4
The basis of the bargain language presents two problems. One is
Role Reliance?, 34 U. Prrr. L. REV. 145 (1972). In some cases, no specific reliance is neces-
sary for recovery for breach of warranty. See, e.g., Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 998 (D.C. Superior Ct. 1973); Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311,
521 P.2d 281 (1974); Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973), rev'd,
213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 43 (1983) (The Author's comment, however, remains valid). In
other cases, an express warranty is created only where the representations are relied upon and
induce the purchase of the product. The mere existence of the statements does not create an
actionable warranty. See, e.g., Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir.
1982); Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974); Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom,
382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676
(D.N.H. 1972); Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Escambia Chemical Corp. v. Industrial Marine Supply Co., 223 So. 2d 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill. App. 3d 530, 358 N.W.2d 382 (1976);
Fletcher v. Coffee County Farmers' Coop., 618 S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
2. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978).
3. UNIF. SALES AcT § 12 (1907).
4. As Grant Gilmore remarked: "Make no mistake: this Code was Llewellyn's Code;
there is not a section, there is hardly a line, which does not bear his stamp and impress; from
beginning to end he inspired, directed and controlled it." Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl
Llewellyn, 71 YALE L. J. 813, 814 (1962).
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the extent to which basis of the bargain comprehends the Uniform
Sales Act requirement of reliance. The other is whether representa-
tions made after the completed transaction can be part of the basis
of the bargain. This latter question is specifically injected into the
discussion by comment 7 to section 2-313, which reads:
The precise time when words of description of affirmation are
made or samples are shown is not material. The sole question is
whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be re-
garded as part of the contract. If language is used after the clos-
ing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery asks and
receives an additional assurance), the warranty becomes a modi-
fication, and need not be supported by consideration if it is other-
wise reasonable and in order (Section 2-209). 5
Commentators seem to be puzzled as to why the U.C.C. has
changed the reliance requirement of the Uniform Sales Act to the
basis of the bargain language of section 2-313. After all, why
should the buyer be able to recover on a representation if he did not
believe it or paid no heed to it in buying? Another problem is that
the commentators and judges have some idea of what reliance is,
but they do not really have any idea what basis of the bargain
means. This Article attempts to define the problems Llewellyn had
with the reliance requirement and discusses how those problems
may help give meaning to the basis of the bargain language. In fact,
the change in the reliance requirement and the post-bargain promise
issues are closely related.
I. THE UNIFORM SALES ACT
Section 12 of the original Uniform Sales Act read as follows:
Definition of Express Warranty. Any affirmation of fact or
any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express war-
ranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer
purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value
of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of
the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty.6
The requirement of reliance was rooted in common law. It came
into the law of sales from both tort and assumpsit. As the author of
the original act, Professor Williston, stated:
As it is essential to maintain the action of deceit that the
plaintiff should have relied, to his injury, on the false statements
complained of, and as it is necessary in assumpsit that the plain-
5. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7 (1978).
6. UNIF. SALES AcT § 12 (1907).
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tiff should have done some act in reliance upon the offer, so it
was an early requirement of the law of warranty that the buyer
should have relied on the warranty .... Doubtless the burden of
proof is on the buyer to establish this as one of the elements of
his case.7
The reliance issue is closely linked to the issue of the time of the
contract. At common law a warranty was a separate bargain re-
quiring offer and acceptance. Even under the Uniform Sales Act,
warranty as a part of the contract of sale focused on offer and ac-
ceptance at some particular point in time, as did the rest of the con-
tract. The concept of the meeting of the minds on all important
issues of the contract at some particular moment was not abolished
by the Uniform Sales Act. Thus the requirement that the buyer rely
on the warranty necessarily entailed the question of when the buyer
relied. As Professor Williston said:
If a warranty be conceived of exclusively as an express con-
tract, it is obvious that an offer of the warrantor accepted by the
buyer is essential. If a statement made by the seller precedes the
sale by a long period and especially if the statement was not
made as part of the negotiations culminating in the sale, it will be
difficult to find such an offer and acceptance. On the other hand,
it is apparent that the buyer may be as completely deceived by
statements prior to the ultimate negotiations as by statements
made at the time of the bargain .... The original basis of war-
ranty, as has been seen, a basis which still cannot be safely lost
sight of, is the deception of the buyer because of his natural and,
therefore, justifiable reliance on the seller's statements ....
There seems no reason to distinguish a case where the seller
makes a statement in regard to goods at the time of the sale, a
little while before that time, or a long time before, if the state-
ment was originally made with reference to a possible sale, or
was expressly or impliedly adopted as the basis for subsequent
negotiations. 8
Williston (but not, by any means, all other authority9 ) was will-
ing to include almost any relevant statement made before the trans-
7. 1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES AcT § 206 (2d ed. 1924).
8. ld.
9. See James & Co. v. Bocage & Co., 45 Ark. 284 (1885) (written representations that
machine "was in good condition and almost as good as new" found not to constitute a war-
ranty); Byrant v. Crosby, 40 Me. 9 (1855) (oral representations made by seller as to age and
condition of sheep, and amount of wool they would produce did not constitute a warranty);
Ransberger v. Ing, 55 Mo. App. 621 (1894) (statement on hog auction notice that hogs were
in "good shape and condition" not a warranty at time of sale); Stucley v. Bailey, 158 Eng.
Rep. 943 (Ex. 1862) (written representations that yacht's masts were "as sound as when put
in" did not constitute a warranty); Hopkins v. Tanqueray, 139 Eng. Rep. 369 (C.P. 1854)
(oral representations that horse was "perfectly sound in all respects" did not constitute a
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action as a basis for warranty.1" Not even Williston, however, was
broad-minded enough to include statements made after the point of
acceptance of the offer:
If the seller's liability on a warranty is based on an agreement
to contract, consideration is essential. Similarly, it is a require-
ment for the maintenance of an action on the case for deceit that
the plaintiff has suffered a detriment because of his reliance upon
the statement; and in an action of tort for breach of warranty the
same element is essential. If a statement was unknown to the
buyer at the time the sale was completed, it is obvious that there
can be neither consideration from the standpoint of the law of
contracts nor detrimental reliance from the standpoint of the law
of torts.11
This last quote also points out that the role of consideration is
adjunct to the role of time, although time remains the most crucial
element. Up to the moment when an offer was accepted, the same
consideration could blanket the whole transaction, regardless of the
number of elements added or subtracted during negotiations. After
that magic moment of acceptance, however, new consideration was
necessary.
An important fact often ignored in analyses of section 2-313 is
that it is not a mere rewrite of section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act.
Although subsection (1)(a) does deal with the subject of former sec-
tion 12, subsections (1)(b) and (c) are concerned with the subject
matter of sections 14 and 16 of the Uniform Sales Act, which read:
Sec. 14. Implied Warranty in Sale by Description. Where
there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by description, there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall correspond with the
description and if the contract or sale be by sample, as well as by
description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corre-
sponds with the sample if the goods do not also correspond with
warranty); Camac v. Warriner, 135 Eng. Rep. 577 (C.P. 1845) (prospectus which represented
a product as fit for roofing did not constitute a warranty).
10. Naturally there are limitations on this statement, particularly in the case of perisha-
ble goods. Among cases on point are those involving a perishable and expensive chattel, the
race horse. It would seem clear that given the speed with which these animals self-destruct, a
statement about the condition of one of them would not be given credence more than a few
hours after it was made. Indeed, the cases imply that the animals are subject to such a variety
of maladies that it is very difficult for a statement about one of them to be anything more than
an expression of opinion and not a warranty. See, eg., Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, 400 F.2d
112 (2d Cir. 1968); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 568 F.2d 770 (2d
Cir. 1978); McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55 (Pa. 1839); Walker v. Kirk, 72 Pa. Super. 534
(1919); Wilkinson v. Stettler, 72 Pa. Super. 47 (1911); Hopkins v. Tanqueray, 139 Eng. Rep.
369 (C.P. 1854). The impression of unfairness one perceives in reading some of these "used
horse" cases may in fact be unwarranted.
11. 1 S. WILLIsTON, supra note 7, § 211.
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the description .... 12
Sec. 16. Implied Warranties in Sale by Sample. In the case of
a contract to sell or a sale by sample:
(a) There is an implied warranty that the bulk shall corre-
spond with the sample in quality ... .3
Much of the confusion about the basis of the bargain language
of the U.C.C. is traceable to the interaction of these three sections of
the Uniform Sales Act. The three types of express warranty envi-
sioned by the U.C.C. were in fact three very different warranties
under the Uniform Sales Act, and Llewellyn accorded them very
different priorities.14
II. LLEWELLYN'S VIEWS AND THE 1941 AND 1944 DRAFTS
In an article written in 1937, Llewellyn discussed all three of
these warranties. 5 As to the express warranty of section 12, he was
quite offhand: "the easiest of all warranties to negate are those la-
belled 'express' ..... 1 What Llewellyn meant by this phrase is not
amplified by the text, but it is easy enough to hazard a guess. At
common law, courts posed all sorts of obstacles to the enforcement
of express warranties. 17  Some courts adhered to that tradition
under the Uniform Sales Act, i" even though the Act supposedly
12. UNIF. SALES AcT § 14 (1907).
13. Id. § 16.
14. Infra notes 15-54 and accompanying text.
15. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society (pt. 2), 37 COLuM. L. REv. 341, 384
(1937).
16. Id. at 384.
17. See Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (court rejected assertions of
warranty; fraud or deceit by vendor must be shown to allow a remedy); McFarland v. New-
man, 9 Watts 55 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1939) (court rejected warranty claim on grounds that state-
ment was the opinion of the seller); Chandelor v. Lopus, Croke's Rep. (Jacobus) 4, 79 Eng.
Rep. 3 (Ex. Ch. 1889) (purchaser had no cause of action because it is assumed that every
seller will affirm that his product is good); Budd v. Fairmaner, 8 Bingham's Rep. 48, 131 Eng.
Rep. 318 (C.P. 1831) (court distinguished between a simple representation and a warranty).
18. Alaska Pacific Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1948)
(involving an action by buyer for breach of warranty that ply-metal boxes were suitable for
packaging buyer's soup mixtures - court held evidence was insufficient to establish an express
warranty); Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & Coke Co., 334 Ill. 281, 165 N.E.
793 (1929) (Written contract for sale of coal contained some specifications as to quality and
also stipulated that there were no understandings or agreements outside the written letter of
the contract. Court held that buyer of coal could not later assert that written contract was
incomplete, thus precluding admission of parol evidence.); Kolodzack v. Peerless Motor Co.,
255 Mich. 47, 237 N.W. 41 (193 1) (involving contract for sale of automobile - court held that
contract containing express warranty that negated the existence of other outside warranties
precluded any implied warranty from being read into the contract); Little v. Widener, 226
Mo. App. 525, 32 S.W.2d 116 (1930) (denying the existence of an implied warranty where the
parties entered a written contract providing that the express warranty alone governed the
[Vol. 38:1
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adopted more liberal views towards express warranties and section
12 did not require any particular language for the creation of an
express warranty. In a sense, even under the Uniform Commercial
Code an express warranty is the easiest of the warranties to avoid.
The seller merely needs to keep his mouth shut or his pen still.
Another aspect of the express warranty under the Uniform Sales
Act was that the buyer had to demonstrate reliance upon the seller's
statement. This requirement could provide the courts with a de
facto method of negating express warranties where they were so mo-
tivated. 9 For these reasons, Llewellyn may well have been wary of
trusting express warranty under the Uniform Sales Act.
Sale by description was, at common law, a matter of express
warranty and was transposed into an implied warranty in the Uni-
form Sales Act by historic accident.2 ° Llewellyn seized on this fact
to distinguish sale by description from both express warranty and
sale by sample. A great many warranties which we would now la-
bel "express," if not the large majority, are doubtless descriptive in
nature. Since Llewellyn had little faith in the strength of express
warranty under the Uniform Sales Act, however, his hope was ap-
parently to clothe implied warranty by description in a special
protection:
sale); North Co. v. Beebe, 11 N.J. Misc. 759, 168 A. 632 (1933) (A written contract for sale of
piano, which contained no warranties, stipulating that any conflicting communication be-
tween the parties was annulled, and authorizing contract changes exclusively in writing, was
held to preclude any other implied or express warranties.); Brooks Co. v. Storr, 111 N.J.L.
316, 168 A. 382 (1932) (Involving an action by seller under a written sales contract. Buyer's
defense was that seller did not fulfill an oral agreement outside the contract - court held for
plaintiff-seller and mandated payment under the express terms of the contract); Bowser v.
McCormack, 230 App. Div. 303, 243 N.Y.S. 442 (1930) (provision that the written contract
between the parties precluded all other agreement, prevented buyers from relying on an ex-
press oral warranty); Dayton Oakland Co. v. Livesay, 34 Ohio App. 302, 170 N.E. 880 (1929)
(buyer was limited in recovery against defendant-seller to those damages arising under ex-
press written terms of written guaranty with 90-day limitation); Bechtold v. Murray Ohio
Mfg. Co., 321 Pa. 423, 184 A. 49 (1936) (sale contract provision stipulating that no future
claim for damages would be allowed precluded plaintiff from recovery). Even under the Uni-
form Sales Act, of course, the courts could move with the times. The court in Dayton Oak-
land Co. v. Livesay, 34 Ohio App. 302, 170 N.E. 880 (1929) upheld the limitations on a
ninety-day, parts-replacement-only warranty despite the fact that the buyer had been jailed in
Texas, 1500 miles from home, because the manufacturer had engaged in the practice of put-
ting the same serial numbers on two different cars. Later inspection also revealed a defective
distributor shaft, necessitating shipping the car from Texas to Ohio, and cylinders manufac-
tured in different sizes. By contrast, a later court would invalidate almost identical limita-
tions on warranty in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In
the interim, of course, technology in the auto industry had advanced immensely, and there
might have been good reason for differing results in the two cases.
19. See, eg., Beckett v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427 (1937).
20. Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 384.
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As to description, in Section 14, it was genius or prophecy
that informed the accident by which that main root of the
growth of representation into "express" warranty was excised
and transplanted into the orchard of the "implied." For the easi-
est of all warranties to negate are those labeled "express;"
whereas the one thing which should never be allowed to be ne-
gated-at least as a condition, under Act, Section 1 l(1)-is a de-
scription, when taken seriously .... Surely a case is to be made
for Section 14-at least in its condition aspect- being ... an
iron section whose effect no agreement can upset, even under
Section 71.21
Llewellyn's problem in making this argument, as the last quote
suggests, was that section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act appeared to
provide specifically for the ability of the parties to contract out of
implied warranties:
Sec. 71. Variation of Implied Obligations. Where any right,
duty or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by
implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express
agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by
custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the con-
tract or the sale.2"
In order to avoid the operation of section 71 on section 14, Llewel-
lyn reasoned that there are two kinds of implied warranty, those
implied by the contract and those implied by law. The former
could be disclaimed by the parties, the latter could not:2 3
It happens also, in the particular matter of warranty, that
"implied" is a term of two wholly disparate meanings. As has
long been familiar from the theory of quasi-contract, an "im-
plied" obligation can be either one which reads the parties' inten-
tion when the parties have not spoken, or can be one dropped
around the parties' necks by law, to subserve justice.24
The warranty by description, according to Llewellyn, could not be
disclaimed under this analysis, in contrast to implied warranties of
merchantability, fitness for particular purpose, and sale by sample,
all of which could be disclaimed.
The evolution of Llewellyn's 1937 views into the theories which
were shortly to be expressed in the successive drafts of the U.C.C.
provide very useful insights into the meaning of basis of the bargain.
The first serious working draft for the Uniform Commercial Code
was the second draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act of 1941.
21. Id. at 384-85 (footnotes omitted).
22. UNIF. SALES ACT § 71 (1907).
23. Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 386-87.
24. Id. at 385-86.
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That document retained the basic form and numbering system of
the original, but nevertheless included some striking changes. Sec-
tion 12 of the Revised Act was substantively the same as the origi-
nal, although it was expanded to be more definite.2"
In section 14, however, we see the sweeping and unmistakable
influence of Llewellyn's thought as expressed in his 1937 article.
Section 14. Warranty by Operation of Law.
(1) Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by
description, there is a warranty that the goods shall correspond
with the description.
(2) The effect of this section is not subject to abrogation or
modification by contract.2 6
This section, as we can see, almost exactly echoes Llewellyn's
views, and is indeed an "iron" section. The comments supply ex-
actly the rationale one would expect to hear:
Warranty by operation of law. The phrase "implied war-
ranty," which was used in the First Act in this Section, is unwise
to use with reference to the basic subject-matter of the
transaction.
The situation here is that of constructive warranty (and con-
dition), or obligation by operation of law, imposed for basic rea-
sons of public policy. You cannot both have a legally effective
sale or contract to sell and avoid becoming responsible that what
you deliver is its subject-matter. A rule so stating, like the stat-
ute of frauds or the rule that you cannot presently sell future
goods, controls contract ....
What the bargain can do, is to define the contract: as by a
limitation of warranty, like "as is"; but even then, sawdust in
boxes does not conform to "boxed grapes, as is." '27
In this section and its comments there is no requirement of reliance,
and there is no particular reason why there should be. Under the
old act, reliance was a factor in express warranty, not implied war-
ranty, which was what sale by description had been under old sec-
tion 14. Not only does the buyer not have to plead reliance, under
the revision, but it is not even possible for the buyer and seller to
contract out of the section, whether the buyer has relied or not.
Section 16 of the old act, on warranties by sample or model, was
considerably expanded by the Revised Act along technical lines.2"
For the most part, those changes are of no concern here. The most
25. REVISED UNIF. SALES Acr § 12 comment 1 (National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws) (Report and Second Draft 1941).
26. Id. § 14.
27. Id. § 14 comment 1.
28. The revised section reads as follows:
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important one for the purpose of this Article is in the title, which
was changed from "Implied Warranties in Sale by Sample" to
"Warranties by Sample or Model."29 The comments do not enlarge
upon this change. The most important substantive part of the sec-
tion, subsection (3), merely says "there is a warranty that the bulk
shall correspond with the sample or model in kind and quality. '30
Thus this section straddles the issue of whether this warranty is ex-
press, implied, or implied in law.
The 1944 draft of the Sales Act31 produced much greater revi-
sions of the original than the 1941 version, including a new number-
ing system. More importantly, in this draft, for the first time, the
materials of sections 12, 14, and 16 of the original draft were drawn
together in a single section and called "express":
SECTION 37. EXPRESS WARRANTIES BY AFFIRMATION,
PROMISE, DESCRIPTION, SAMPLE. (1) Express warranties by
the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise which relates to
the goods and is made by the seller to the buyer as a part of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made a basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made a basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
SECTION 16. Warranties by Sample or .Model.
(1) A sale or a contract to sell is "by sample" or "by model" when a sample
drawn from an ascertained bulk or a "model" of unascertained goods is so incorpo-
rated into the bargain that the buyer has reason to rely, and does rely, on the whole
of the goods conforming to the sample or model. But mere exhibition of a speci-
men, accompanied by language clearly negating any seller's obligation that the
whole shall conform thereto, does not constitute the sale or contract to sell one by
sample or by model.
(2) Where a seller exhibits to the buyer a specimen purporting to be drawn from
an existing bulk, there is an implied warranty that the specimen has been fairly
drawn.
(3) If a sale or a contract to sell is one by sample or model, there is a warranty
that the bulk shall correspond with the sample or model in kind and quality.
(4) Where the sample is drawn from an existing bulk, there is an implied war-
ranty that, on request, the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity, before deliv-
ery or payment, for comparing the bulk with the sample. Failure so to request and
compare does not impair the buyer's right in regard to inspection at or after deliv-
ery, nor does commercial use of the sample, or of a bulk sample accompanying a lot
delivered.
Id. § 16(1)-(4).
29. Id. § 16(3).
30. Id.
31. UNIF. REVISED SALES ACT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
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goods shall conform to the sample or model. 2
The most obvious change wrought by this section in the 1941 revi-
sion is that the warranties by description and model have become
express. Given Llewellyn's views as expressed in 1937 one may well
ask how this could happen. One suggested answer is simply that in
1937 Llewellyn was writing a polemical article, the object of which
was to cause his views to prevail under existing statute and case law.
That existing law indicated that an express warranty could be dis-
claimed,33 that it had no effect if given after the deal was struck
unless supported by additional consideration 34 and that it might be
open to challenge if given before, not at the precise time, the deal
was concluded." Now he was being given the chance to write the
law as he wanted it, and in his opinion, when a seller said something
express about his product, the seller should be held to it: "'What
we need in business is common honesty of speech,' telling the truth
about commodities and standing ready to make good one's
assertions. ' 3
6
The 1944 regrouping of express warranties was supplemented
with a radical revision of section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act, re-
numbered section 41:
(1) If the agreement creates an express warranty, words dis-
claiming it are inoperative.
(2) Exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of
merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose must be in
specific terms and if the inclusion of such terms creates an ambi-
guity in the contract as a whole, it shall be resolved against the
seller except that
(a) all implied warranties are excluded by general lan-
guage like 'as is,' 'as they stand,' 'with all faults' or other
terms which in common understanding call the buyer's atten-
tion to the exclusion of warranties and make plain that there
is no implied warranty; and
(b) when before contracting the buyer has examined the
goods or the sample or the model as fully as he desired, or
has refused to examine the goods, there is no implied war-
ranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in
the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
32. Id. § 37(1)(a)-(c).
33. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 213.
34. Id. § 211.
35. Id. §§ 209-10.
36. UNIF. REVISED SALE AcT § 37 comment at 146 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944)
(quoting Foote v. Wilson, 104 Kan. 191, 178 P. 430 (1919)).
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by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of
trade.
(3) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited under
Sections 122-124. 37
When we look at the interplay between sections 41 and 37 of the
1944 draft, a number of observations can be made. First, parts (a),
(b), and (c) of subsection (1) of section 37 do not contain parallel
requirements. Part (a) requires that the affirmation or promise
merely be part of the bargain. Parts (b) and (c) require that the
description, sample, or model be a basis of the bargain. The obvious
inference to be drawn from this difference in language is that the
seller had absolute liability for any promise or affirmation made in
the course of the bargaining process, an inference reinforced by the
language of section 41 disallowing disclaimer. As to description,
sample, or model, the seller's liability extended only to those made a
basis of the bargain. But what was a basis of the bargain? Llewel-
lyn's views provide a possible answer.
In 1937 Llewellyn stated that: "the one thing which should
never be allowed to be negated-at least as a condition, under Act,
Section 11(l)-is a description, when taken seriously."38 Section
11(1) reads: "Where the obligation of either party to a contract to
sell or sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such
party may refuse to proceed with the contract or sale or he may
waive performance of the condition. ' 39 This reading suggests that a
basis of the bargain may, in this version, be the equivalent of a con-
dition of the contract. To be sure, the revisions of the Sales Act were
largely eschewing the rigidities of the common law of contract, in-
cluding its condition baggage; but there was, at the time Llewellyn
was engaged in drafting this section, a discussion in process which
may have influenced his thinking.
That discussion centered on the retention of the perfect tender
rule in the revisions of the Act. Professors Kessler and Gilmore
have noted:
During the 1940's, while the Code was being drafted, there
was a good deal of discussion in the law reviews of the desirabil-
ity of scrapping the late nineteenth century rules which had given
the buyer an almost unlimited right to reject. Something like the
rule of substantial performance which Section 45(2) of the Uni-
form Sales Act had applied to installment contracts should, it
37. UNIF. REVISED SALES ACT § 41 (1944).
38. Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 384.
39. REVISED UNIF. SALES AT § 11 (Report and Second Draft 1941).
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was said, be made applicable to all contracts of sale.40
A logical reading of Llewellyn's article in 1937 and the 1944
version of the Code, therefore, is that when a description, sample,
or model was deemed sufficiently important to the contract as to be
a condition under the old section 11(1), it would be a basis of the
bargain. The consequence of a description, sample, or model being
a basis of the bargain was that the buyer would be excused from
accepting a tender which did not conform to such description, sam-
ple, or model if the perfect tender rule were changed. In any event,
the buyer would be excused from acceptance of an installment if it
did not conform to such a basis of the bargain.
It is not difficult to see why there should be a difference in treat-
ment between a promise or affirmation and description, model, or
sample. The promises and affirmations referred to are positive acts
committed in the course of the disputed bargain. Any seller re-
specting common honesty of speech should be expected to back
these up whether they appear to be significant or not in the context
of the deal. On the other hand, pre-existing descriptions, samples,
or models of the seller's product may well have been seen by the
buyer but in fact may have no relevance to the particular deal in
question. Therefore, the seller should be held only to those descrip-
tions, samples, or models which were furnished in regard to this
bargain. In the comment to section 37 Llewellyn made this distinc-
tion more explicit:
Sample or model: The basic situation is not different with
regard to sample. But the facts are often more ambiguous when
a "specimen" is shown. When the seller exhibits a sample pur-
porting to be drawn from an existing bulk, good faith of course
requires in any event that the sample shall have been fairly
drawn.
But in mercantile experience the mere exhibition of a "sam-
ple" or specimen does not of itself show whether it is to "sug-
gest" or to "be" the character of the subject-matter of the
contract .... [T]he question in regard to the sample is merely
whether the seller has so acted with reference to the sample as to
make him responsible that the whole shall have at least the val-
ues shown by the sample.4 1
The comment to section 37 also indicates that Llewellyn contin-
ued to adhere to his idea of the supremacy of a "description":
Unified contract basis of warranty: Under this Act warranties
40. F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 843 (2d ed.
1970).
41. UN IF. REVISED SALES ACT § 37 comment (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
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are an essential part of the contract for sale. Fundamentally, all
warranties are summed up in "description" under the present
section; it requires the whole net effect of the bargain to effec-
tively describe what kind and quality of thing the seller has as-
sumed obligation to sell and deliver. It does serve convenience to
particularize rules on warranty which deal with some familiar
and recurrent sets of fact, but the object remains single: it is to
arrive at the net description which defines the seller's obligation
.... In life, affirmations of fact which relate to the goods and
which are made by a seller in connection with a bargain about
goods are taken as part of the description of the goods contracted
about; in life, no particular reliance needs to be shown in order to
weave such affirmations into the fabric of the agreement. In-
stead, what needs an affirmative showing is that there has been
any fact which gives clear objective justification for the unusual
result of taking such affirmations out of what has been agreed
upon.
42
This comment also makes another important matter perfectly
clear: reliance is no longer the crucial factor in express warranty.
Unfortunately, even though equivalent language was carried over in
the final comment 3 to section 2-313, modem courts have not al-
ways accepted it seriously.4 3 In light of the combining of sections
12, 14, and 16 into the new section 37, and the importance Llewel-
lyn attached to the role of warranty by description, no other conclu-
sion seems possible. While warranty by description remained an
implied warranty under section 14 of the Uniform Sales Act, it re-
quired no reliance, and Llewellyn even claimed that it arose by op-
eration of law. There is no reason to think that the Code's drafters
intended to insert a reliance requirement into warranty by descrip-
tion merely because that warranty was now classified as express.
On the contrary, the Code's language omits reliance.
A later part of the comment to section 37, addressing the time of
42. Id.
43. Many modem courts continue to require reliance when applying the U.C.C. section
2-313 language. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d
1092 (1lth Cir. 1983); Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982);
Royal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980); Bigelow v. Agway,
Inc., 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974); Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir.
1967); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978);
Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D. N.H. 1972); Thursby v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 476 So. 2d 676 (Fla.
1985); Escambia Chemical Corp. v. Industrial-Marine Supply Co., 223 So. 2d 773 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967), appeal after remand, 238 So. 2d 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Stamm v.
Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976); Fletcher v. Coffee County
Farmers' Coop., 618 S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
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creation of the warranty, also emphasizes that reliance is no longer
an important factor in express warranty.
"Warranty" language after closing contract: The early cases
paid no attention to the precise moment in which "warranty"
language was used, taking, for instance, a description in a bill of
sale made after the bargain as an adequate indication of what the
bargain had been. The later theoretical concept of "reliance"
had led to some technical discussion of the precise moment of
"warranting," with equally technical evasion of that technical
road of escape from obligation .... Under this Act the question
takes a wholly different turn, in line with earlier authorities. The
question is: is the language fairly to be regarded as a part of the
contract? If the language was used before the closing, that an-
swers itself. If the language was used after the closing, but in
reasonable follow-up (as when the buyer within a short time and
in conjunction with taking delivery asks and receives the addi-
tional assurance), then the language becomes at worst a modifica-
tion under Section 24(1) of this Act, which has no need for
consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order.44
This language was the origin of the text now found in comment
7 to section 2-313:
The precise time when words of description or affirmation are
made or models or samples are shown is not material. The sole
question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly
to be regarded as part of the contract. If language is used after
the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery
asks and receives an additional assurance), the warranty becomes
a modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is
otherwise reasonable and in order. 5
In the transition from the 1944 draft to the final language of
comment 7, some important language was lost. All of the language
relating to reliance disappeared. That language was very signifi-
cant, because it underscored the relation between reliance and the
moment of creation of the warranty. The formation provisions of
the U.C.C. largely abolish the concept of meeting of the minds at
some particular moment as a requirement of a contract of sale. Sec-
tion 2-204(2) states: "An agreement sufficient to constitute a con-
tract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is
undetermined."46 A concommitant of the elimination of the meet-
ing of the minds formula is the elimination of the mirror-image ac-
ceptance rule in section 2-207, for if there is no particular moment
when the minds of the parties must agree on all elements of the
44. UNiF. REVISED SALES AcT § 37 comment (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944)
45. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7 (1978).
46. Id. § 2-204(2).
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contract, then there is no need to require an exact acceptance of all
terms by either party at any particular time. These points are em-
phasized by the definitions of contract and agreement in Section 1-
201 of the U.C.C.:
"Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from
the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any other ap-
plicable rules of law. (Compare "Agreement".) 47
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or by implication from other circum-
stances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance as provided in this Act .... Whether an agreement
has legal consequences is determined by the provisions of this
Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts .... (Com-
pare "Contract") 48
Thus the disappearance of reliance corresponds with the disappear-
ance of other awkward rigidities of formation in the U.C.C.
Another major change from the preliminary to the final version
of comment 7 is the disappearance of two small words, at worst,
before a modification in the last sentence.49 The original language
clearly envisaged that an express warranty issued after the signing
of the contract would become a part of the original contract of the
parties. In some instances, where there was a parol evidence or in-
tegration clause problem, such a post-signing warranty might be re-
garded as a modification. The dropping of the words "at worst" has
raised the possibility that any such post-closing language is a modi-
fication, which has caused distress for some commentators. White
and Summers have remarked:
Section 2-209 and the modification analysis validate only a
handful of all the possible post-deal warranties. First, section 2-
209 contemplates an "agreement modifying a contract .... ." It
is far from self-evident that a seller's post-sale words uttered dur-
ing delivery are an "agreement of modification," and one can
hardly attribute that bilateral connotation to an advertisement
that is not published until after the sale. Indeed, [c]omment 7
seems to contemplate only the cases of face-to-face dealing that
occur while the deal is still warm. Second, any oral modification
of a contract for goods costing more than $500 must somehow
meet the statute of frauds under 2-209(3) or constitute a waiver
of the statute under 2-209(4). As we point out elsewhere, the
statute of frauds and waiver provisions of 2-209 are highly am-
biguous, and one might read them as prohibiting oral modifica-
47. Id. § 1-201(11).
48. Id. § 1-201(3).
49. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7 (1978).
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tion on items costing more than $500. °
Many of the above reservations of White and Summers will not
withstand close scrutiny. First of all, comment 7 states flatly that a
post-closing warranty "becomes a modification."51 The issuance of
the warranty creates a modification without any further agree-
ment-if necessary, the warranty is implied by law. That reading is
also dictated by the original form of the comment which, as a mat-
ter of policy, provided that post-agreement warranties were not nec-
essarily modifications and therefore would not need to meet any of
the standards of section 2-209.52
The statute of frauds question is not problematic. Section 2-
209(3) provides: "The requirements of the statute of frauds section
of this Article [section 2-201] must be satisfied if the contract as
modified is within its provisions. 53 This provision would appear
by its terms to apply to the entire contract, not merely the modifica-
tion. Since a warranty is not likely to affect the price or quantity of
the merchandise, it is not likely to change the status of the contract
under the statute of frauds.
The fact that the post-closing warranty covers only face-to-face
undertakings while the deal is still warm is no more persuasive.
There is no indication that only face-to-face transactions are gov-
erned by comment 7, nor is there any indication as to the time
within which the warranty must be given. It is true the original
comment to section 37 did use the words "within a short time" in
its illustrative example; but those words were not obligatory and
were eliminated in subsequent drafts.54 In any case, the operative
concept in the example is that the warranty be given in conjunction
with delivery. This merely emphasizes that the U.C.C. does not
attach magical significance to any particular moment in the bar-
gaining process, but rather looks at the deal as a whole. The exam-
ple demonstrates nothing more than the commonplace observation
that tender of delivery gives rise to the buyer's obligation to pay for
the merchandise unless he rejects it,55 and usually ends the bargain-
50. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 337-38.
51. U.CC. § 2-313, comment 7 (1978).
52. UNIF. REVISED SALES Acr § 37 comment (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
53. U.C.C. § 2-209(3) (1978).
54. It is an interesting point whether, in successive drafts of legislation, words are elimi-
nated because the drafters do not wish the concept the eliminated words represent to be
incorporated in the subsequent draft, or because they think the subsequent draft incorporates
the concept adequately without the deleted language. Neither assumption is justified without
analysis of the sense of the context.
55. U.C.C. § 2-507 (1978).
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ing phase of the deal. Until the merchandise actually goes into the
buyer's door, the deal is still quite fluid and many adjustments may
be made.
III. THE ALASKA PACIFIC SALMON CASE
At a crucial period in their creation of the Uniform Commercial
Code, Karl Llewellyn and Sonia Mentschikoff were confronted with
a case which tested many of their theories, Alaska Pacific Salmon
Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co. 6 Ms. Mentschikoff participated in both
the trial and appeal of the case for the unsuccessful plaintiffs.
A number of factors support the hypothesis that the Alaska Pa-
cific case was peculiarly illustrative of the situations Llewellyn and
Mentschikoff meant to cover in the warranty provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.57 In the commercial law casebook pre-
pared jointly by Llewellyn and Mentschikoff58 the Alaska Pacific
case is the subject of an entire section and, at nineteen pages, the
case reprint is the longest in the book,59 exceeding such substantial
favorites as Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors60 and Seely v. White
Motor Company.6 t
A review of the Alaska Pacific case, particularly in light of the
frustrations suffered by plaintiff's counsel, throws a great deal of
light on the goals Llewellyn and Mentschikoff were trying to ac-
complish. In Alaska Pacific, the plaintiff was about to introduce a
line of dehydrated soups to the retail market and required a form of
packaging which would not allow any of the fat content of the soup
to come in contact with the outside air (such contact results in a
phenomenon known as wicking in which rancidity is conducted
from outside the package to the contents).62 Before any relevant
documents were signed, plaintiff made the defendant aware that it
required packages which would not wick. Defendant assured plain-
tiff that it could supply such containers and reported the results of
56. 163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1948).
57. I was a friend, though not a close one, of Ms. Mentschikoff from 1962 to 1984. I
also studied under Llewellyn the year that Llewellyn died. I do not claim any special insight
into the minds of either of these people as a result of these contacts. Indeed, I greatly regret
that the ideas I am about to propose came to me too late to discuss them with Ms. Ment-
schikoff, and I in no way represent them as having her approval.
58. S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1968).
59. Id. at 127-46.
60. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See id. at 167-68. Seventeen pages of Henningsen
are reprinted in the casebook.
61. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965). See id. at 184-97. Thirteen pages of Seely are
reprinted in the casebook.
62. 163 F.2d at 645-46.
[Vol. 38:1I
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION of U.C.C. § 2-313
tests to plaintiff which were sufficiently reassuring. Subsequently,
the plaintiff began supplying written orders.63
The facts and course of litigation of the case were considerably
complicated because the country was on the brink of entering the
Second World War and the parties may have been attempting to
create a situation in which they would have a priority if aluminum
rationing was imposed. On March 13, 15, and 17 of 1941, the par-
ties signed successive orders for 10 million, 40 million, and 100 mil-
lion, soup containers, respectively." Plaintiff's position was that
these orders were not bona fide, being intended only to preserve the
parties' position in the face of approaching rationing.65
The order of March 17 was on defendant's form and contained
on its face the statement:
Purpose or Application of Product Packing Soup Mix66
On the back of the form defendant had included the standard boil-
erplate language: "Seller undertakes that products sold hereunder
to Buyer shall correspond to the specifications on the front hereof;
and Seller hereby expressly excludes all, any, or other, warranties,
guarantees, or representations whatsoever."'6 7 On March 18, de-
fendant acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's order on a form which
again carried a boilerplate disclaimer of warranty. Plaintiff's agent
testified that on receipt of this alleged acknowledgment he com-
plained to defendant's agent that there was no deal to be
acknowledged.68
Thereafter the agents of plaintiff and defendant were in almost
daily contact.6 9 On April 7, plaintiff wrote to defendant to correct
the wording on the packages.7° On April 18, the General Manager
of the defendant wrote to plaintiff enclosing laboratory reports pur-
63. Id. at 647.
64. Id. at 645.
65. Id. at 647, 659. In fact, plaintiff suffered a considerable burden in proving this alle-
gation. The defendant's agent in these negotiations, whose deposition flatly denied these con-
tentions, had, by the time of trial, entered military service and had subsequently died. The
defendant's counsel nevertheless managed to cloak the agent's testimony in a protective veil
of patriotism, and, as Judge Frank remarked: "The verdict indicates that, on this issue, the
jury disbelieved Allen [plaintiff's agent]. It may be that the jury's reaction to this disbelieved
testimony, as to his willingness to cheat his government, had some effect on other aspects of
the verdict." Id. at 659 n.20. (Part of this information also comes from private conversations
with M. Mentschikoff.)
66. Id. at 645.
67. Id. at 646-47.
68. Id. at 659.
69. Id. at 652.
70. Id. at 649.
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porting to prove that no wicking action would occur in these con-
tainers. This letter contained the statement:
It will also interest you to know, as evidenced by the enclosed
samples, that the inside of the Ply-Metal container did not de-
velop any corrosion or contamination of any kind and that the
wick action of the exposed paper board edge on the inside was
practically nil; in other words, it appears the Ply-Metal container
will give you the maximum protection you can hope to get for
your dehydrated soup products.71
Plaintiff's agent testified that on receipt of this letter he told defend-
ant to proceed with manufacturing, but within a few months the
packages started to wick and the soups spoiled on the store
shelves.7 2 The results were disastrous for the product, because it
was newly introduced and no consumer loyalty in the product had
yet developed. As a result, the plaintiff claimed large consequential
damages.
7 3
The judge's instructions to the jury were lengthy and complex.
After a long and confusing trial, he sent the jury to its deliberations
without the slightest idea of what it was supposed to do.74 It re-
turned a verdict in favor of the defendant.75
Plaintiff's appeal centered on the judge's refusal to give a di-
rected verdict in its favor and on the jury instructions. 76 In af-
firming the judgment of the trial court,7 7 Judge Jerome Frank, mi
his opinion, took a number of positions which the Uniform Com-
mercial Code seems to oppose directly in theory. In taking these
positions, Judge Frank had a great deal of fun at the expense of
Llewellyn and Mentschikoff, and rubbed their noses in the defeat in
a way which would have been particularly annoying to Llewellyn.
The appeal in the Alaska Pacific case primarily raised the issues
71. Id.
72. Id. at 650.
73. Id.
74. As Ms. Mentschikoff left the courtroom, one of the female jurors, presumably out of
sympathy for a young woman in the then unusual position of trying major corporate litiga-
tion, stopped her and apologized for the verdict, claiming that the jury had not understood
the instructions and had thought that its verdict was more in the line of a compromise which
would allow Alaska Pacific substantial, but not complete recovery. Ms. Mentschikoff relayed
this information to her co-counsel, but they decided against moving for a new trial on the
basis of the information. They supposed that a new trial would be just as long and confusing
as the first, and that the judge's instructions were not likely to be any better the second time
unless they could first succeed in getting the law clarified to their advantage by an appellate
court. They elected to appeal rather than to move for a new trial.
75. 163 F.2d at 644.
76. Id. at 658.
77. Id. at 657.
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of the creation of express warranties, implied warranties of fitness
for particular purpose, and disclaimers.78 Judge Frank's opinion
does not always distinguish clearly between the two kinds of war-
ranties, but what does come out clearly is a form of reasoning to-
tally inconsistent with the type of analysis suggested by the Code
which Llewellyn and Mentschikoff were then in the process of writ-
ing. In discussing the motion for a directed verdict, Judge Frank
reasoned as follows:
The first question is whether, on the indisputable record facts,
plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict based upon proof of
facts creating an express warranty... or an implied warranty
We shall assume that the indisputable record facts demon-
strate the following: (1) After negotiations between the parties,
plaintiff made an offer, in the form of an order, on March 17,
1941, to purchase 100,000,000 boxes from defendant. (2) De-
fendant, by its letter of March 18 and the enclosed "formal ac-
knowledgment," made a counter-offer. (3) Plaintiff's letter of
April 7 was an acceptance, by conduct, of defendant's counter-
offer. (In considering the motion, this must be taken as a fact,
because a jury might reasonably so have found; accordingly, in
this context, we disregard as irrelevant defendant's April 18 let-
ter and the accompanying reports, but we will consider them in
point 2, infra, dealing with the judge's charge.) (4) The negotia-
tions prior to March 17 would have given rise to an implied war-
ranty, unless the counter-offer contained a disclaimer provision
effectively precluding such warranties.79
This kind of analysis was exactly what the drafters of the U.C.C.
were trying to make irrelevant. This is a laborious common law
type of analysis: offer, counter-offer, and finally acceptance. The
magical moment of contract appears, in this analysis, to be April 7.
Nothing would have surprised the plaintiff or defendant more, at
the time of their dealings, than to realize that their legal rights were
being permanently shaped by a letter which purported neither to
make nor accept an offer, but in fact was merely trying to make a
trivial adjustment in the wording to be printed on the package.
Nevertheless, Judge Frank did make this event the magic moment
of contracting, and used this technicality as an excuse to ignore the
very real representations and laboratory reports sent to plaintiff on
April 18, pursuant to which the plaintiff finally approved
production. 80
78. Id. at 654-56.
79. Id. at 655 (footnotes omitted).
80. Id.
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According to the drafts of the Code then in process, it did not
matter on what date a formal closing occurred-the persuasive
April 18 letter and reports would have constituted a warranty either
before or after the closing.81 Plaintiff's briefs, however, did not
press this analysis. Perhaps they realized that it would have been
futile. Instead, the plaintiff concentrated its efforts on persuading
the jury and appellate court that acceptance might not have oc-
curred until plaintiff gave the order to produce after receiving the
April 18 letter.82
The court was particularly concerned with the disclaimer lan-
guage in the forms.8 3 The Court questioned whether the disclaimer
language disclaimed an express warranty already made or pre-
vented the representations from ever becoming a warranty.84 Judge
Frank concluded: "We find nothing in the undisputed evidence of
what occurred, up to and including April 7, which constituted an
express warranty."8 5 In a lengthy footnote, he stated:
I differ from my colleagues as to the road to this conclusion.
I think, but my colleagues do not, that, absent the disclaimer
clause, the first and the last two sentences of defendant's March
18 letter would have been a promise to supply goods fit for plain-
tiff's use, and that this fact, plus plaintiff's purchase of the goods
would have constituted an express warranty ....
I am thus brought face to face with plaintiff's sweeping con-
tention that no sort of express warranty can validly be negatived,
a contention the soundness of which I incline to doubt. For obli-
gations under at least some types of express warranties probably
arise by "implication of law."
If such obligations do arise by "implication of law," they can
perhaps be negatived pursuant to [Section 71 of the Uniform
Sales Act]. To be sure, Llewellyn, chief architect of the draft of
the proposed revised Sales Act, referring to one of its sections
which reads, "If the agreement creates an express warranty,
words disclaiming it are inoperative," indicates that it and re-
lated matter in the draft cover, inter alia, [section] 12 of the pres-
ent Uniform Sales Act . . . "and the better case law thereunder"
.... But earlier, referring to the existing Act, he had said in 37
Col.L.Rev. [sic] at 387 that "the easiest of all warranties to ne-
gate are those labelled 'express ....
However, whether there is such a [warranty] is a matter of
interpretation of all the language of the contract. The contract
81. UNIF. REVISED SALES AcT comment (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
82. 163 F.2d at 654.
83. Id. at 655.
84. Id. at 655-56.
85. Id. at 657.
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(as we must view it on this motion) contains not only the three
sentences above mentioned but also the disclaimer clause; read-
ing the contract as a whole, I conclude that defendant made no
such promise. In other words, I believe, not that the disclaimer
negatived an obligation .... but that a correct interpretation of
the entire contract shows that defendant did not promise to fur-
nish goods fit for plaintiff's use.8 6
Judge Frank's footnote points out an interesting dilemma: does
language negating a warranty cancel a warranty already made or
does it prevent one from being made at all? The distinction was not
particularly important under the old Sales Act, because that Act
did not have a provision barring disclaimer of express warranties.
The new Code being drafted by Llewellyn did have such a provi-
sion: "If the agreement creates an express warranty, words dis-
claiming it are inoperative."8 " Under this language, Judge Frank's
distinction becomes extremely important.
The Alaska Pacific case also addressed the issue of implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The problem was not
whether the warranty was created, but whether the general dis-
claimer contained in the boilerplate on the reverse side of defend-
ant's forms was an adequate disclaimer.88 Judge Frank concluded
that the disclaimers were easily perceived "even to our aging
eyes."8 9 Plaintiff argued, however, that a warranty of fitness for
particular purpose had a special status and could only be disclaimed
by a general disclaimer which was drawn to the buyer's attention.90
Judge Frank responded by stating:
Plaintiff argues that, although other kinds of implied warran-
ties may be excluded by a general disclaimer, the implied war-
ranty of fitness for use ... has such peculiar importance that it
cannot be avoided by a general disclaimer not specifically
brought to the buyer's attention. We doubt the soundness of that
distinction. It is noteworthy that Llewellyn, a distinguished
commentator on the "law of sales," suggests a quite different
classification. He thinks the courts should accord special dignity
86. Id at 657 n.12. Judge Frank cites, among others, Williston:
[I]t is not the law that a seller who by positive affirmation induces a buyer to
enter into a bargain can escape from liability by denying that his affirmation was an
offer to contract. A positive representation is enough to render him liable ....
As an actual agreement to contract is not essential, the obligation of the seller in
such a case is one imposed by law as distinguished from one voluntarily assumed.
I S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 197. This kind of reasoning was obviously rendered obsolete
by the language of the U.C.C.
87. UNIF. REVISED SALES ACT § 41(l) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
88. 163 F.2d at 655.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 656.
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to an implied warranty in a "sale by description" under [section]
14 of the Uniform Act . . . as distinguished from warranties
which he considers of less dignity such as (1) implied warranties
of "fitness for use" and "merchantability" under [section] 15(1)
of the Uniform Act... and (2) "express warranties" under [sec-
tion] 12 of the Uniform Act .... However that may be, plain-
tiff's contention lacks pertinence here: As previously noted,
defendant's letter of March 18 specifically called plaintiff's atten-
tion to the "conditions" contained in the enclosed "acknowledg-
ment," one of those "conditions" being the disclaimer.9 1
Judge Frank was having a great deal of fun at the expense of
Llewellyn and Mentschikoff, who had been married the year before.
Neither plaintiff nor Llewellyn at any time maintained that an im-
plied warranty of fitness for particular purpose was an iron section
as Llewellyn had characterized a warranty by description in 1937.92
One wonders if Judge Frank was being disingenuous in his anal-
ysis of the disclaimer of the implied warranty. The disclaimers were
contained in printed boilerplate on the back of forms supplied by
the seller in what was in essence an adhesion contract. It is, of
course, true that one of defendant's letters did refer to the condi-
tions on the forms, but Judge Frank surely knew that such a refer-
ence was unlikely to alert a layman to the kind of rights being
sacrificed. Interestingly enough, section 41 of the 1944 draft pro-
vided that the disclaimer of an implied warranty of fitness for par-
ticular purpose must be express, but it did not require that the
language be brought to the buyer's attention.9 Furthermore, the
comments to section 41 in the 1944 draft did not suggest that such a
requirement be read into the statute.94
The Alaska Pacific case provides some useful insights into the
thoughts of Llewellyn and Mentschikoff during the crucial drafting
process. It is not inconceivable that this case may have influenced
some aspects of the Code.95 In particular, the 1956 revision of sec-
tion 2-316(1) seems to address directly some of Judge Frank's
analysis.
The Alaska Pacific case also contains a general lesson for inter-
preting the Code's language in section 2-313. Today one views the
Code through a glass highly colored by the pro-consumer activities
of the last twenty years. The Code was drafted, in fact, to cope with
91. Id. (footnotes omitted).
92. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 15.
93. UNIF. REVISED SALES AcT § 41(2) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
94. Id. § 41 comment.
95. See infra text accompanying note 97.
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problems of merchants, as typified by Alaska Pacific, as well as the
problems of consumers.96 The language of comment 7 to section 2-
313 (dealing with the timing of warranty creation) makes much
more sense if viewed in terms of Alaska Pacific rather than in terms
of a consumer who buys a can of paint at the hardware store and
gets an assurance from the clerk as he leaves the front door.9 7
IV. LATER REVISIONS
Section 37 went through two more revisions on its way to be-
coming section 2-313 of the final draft of the Uniform Commercial
Code. In 1948 a summary draft of the proposed revision was pub-
lished without comments.98 In that draft, which retained the 1944
numbering, section 37 was altered. The language of subsection
(1)(b) requiring that a description be a basis of the bargain was
changed to match the language of subsection (1)(a), requiring that
the description be apart of the bargain.99 This change made a good
deal of sense, but was short-lived. In the 1949 revision, subsection
(1)(b) reverted to the language a basis of the bargain,11° and the
1950 version altered subsection (1)(a) to the same construction, so
that all three subsections thereafter required that the warranty be a
basis of the bargain."'1 Obviously, a good deal of soul-searching
was going on in an attempt to discover the proper formulation. The
comments do not reveal the reasons for these changes, but it seems
clear that the standard finally adopted was more restrictive of war-
ranties created by affirmation than the earlier drafts. The contrast
96. As comment 1 to section 2-104 of the U.C.C. states: "This Article assumes that
transactions between professionals in a given field require special and clear rules which may
not apply to a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer. It thus adopts a policy of expressly
stating rules applicable between merchants and as against a merchant, wherever they are
needed .... " An outstanding example of the Code's solicitude for merchants is its institu-
tionalization of Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade in section 1-205 as recognized con-
cepts of the law. Neither of these concepts is likely to be important in a consumer
transaction, but their importance is such that White and Summers have remarked: "Most
commercial law is therefore not in the Code at all but in private agreements, including course
of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance." WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at
7.
97. The White and Summers discussion of comment 7 is entirely in terms of retail con-
sumer sales and is the weaker for it. See WHim & SUMMERS § 9-4, at 337-38. In creating
hypotheticals, of course, it is far easier to invent a simple retail consumer sale situation than
something akin to Alaska Pacific. This may also account for commentators' bias in this
direction.
98. UNIF. REVISED SALES ACr § 37 (Tent. Draft 1948).
99. Id.
100. U.C.C. § 2-313 (May 1949 Draft).
101. U.C.C. § 2-313 (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950).
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in the earlier drafts between part of the bargain and a basis of the
bargain was surely intentional, and must have been for the purpose
of setting up a more restrictive standard on words that might be
uttered without promissory intent.
The version of the Code now universally adopted does not, of
course, read the same as the 1950 version. All three subsections of
the current section 2-313 require that the warranty be part of the
basis of the bargain instead of a basis of the bargain. 102 This change
was adopted in 1956 pursuant to the recommendations of the Edito-
rial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, which revised the
Code to meet criticisms of the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion then considering adoption of the U.C.C. in New York. 10 3 The
1956 recommendations suggest the following reason for the change:
The New York Commission criticized the limitation of sub-
section (1) to language, a sample, or a model which becomes or is
made "a basis of the bargain" on the ground that "basis" might
have been the same connotation as "basic" and thus might dras-
tically restrict the scope of express warranties. To avoid this un-
intended connotation, the phrase "part of the basis of the
bargain" was substituted. 104
The 1956 revision also made extensive changes in section 2-316.
The original subsection (1) of 2-316 had read, "If the agreement
creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inopera-
tive."10' 5 The 1956 revision changed the subsection to its current
form:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each
other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or
extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation is inop-
erative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable. 106
The reason for this change is stated ambiguously, "for clarifica-
tion and to meet criticism by the New York Commission." '0 It
would seem, however, that the change was directly aimed at avoid-
ing the confusion typified by Judge Frank's reasoning in the Alaska
Pacific case. In Alaska Pacific there were words tending to create
102. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1)(a)-(c) (1978).
103. The adoption of the U.C.C. by New York was of paramount importance. Far more
then than now, New York was the commercial center of the country, and if the U.C.C. had
not been adopted by New York, it would probably have become a dead letter.
104. U.C.C. § 2-313 (Recommendations 1956).
105. Id. § 2-316.
106. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1) (1978).
107. U.C.C. § 2-316 (Recommendations 1956).
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warranty and words tending to negate warranty. Judge Frank con-
cluded from this that no warranty was ever created. 0 8 The original
language of section 2-313 would not have clarified this situation,
since it merely says: "If the agreement creates an express warranty
... ,"o0 The revised language, however, provides us with a rule of
construction that would resolve theAlaska Pacific situation in favor
of the buyer, since it provides that the words of negation will be
inoperative.
The 1956 revision of section 2-316 also made a change in the
disclaimer of implied warranty which might have affected the
Alaska Pacific situation. The original subsection (2) read: "Exclu-
sion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability or
of fitness for a particular purpose must be in specific language and if
the inclusion of such language creates an ambiguity in the contract
as a whole it shall be resolved against the seller .... ,,no The 1956
revision amplified the language as follows:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be con-
spicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fit-
ness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous."1
This revised language clearly represents a none-too-happy compro-
mise between those favoring and those opposing broad warranties.
The reason provided for the change was "to relieve the seller from
the requirement of disclaiming the warranty of fitness in specific
language and yet afford the buyer an adequate warning of such dis-
claimer."" 2 The unintended result of this compromise is to make it
easier to disclaim a warranty of merchantability than one of fitness,
since the former can be disclaimed orally. Even the intended objec-
tive of the change is of dubious value, but the revision does at least
have the merit of introducing the concept of conspicuousness to the
disclaimer provisions. The previous draft had called for specificity
without conspicuousness, and operated to validate a highly specific
but inconspicuous disclaimer. This could hardly have been the
U.C.C.'s objective. In the Alaska Pacific situation, of course, the
issue concerned both conspicuousness and specificity, but in that
case the plaintiff had argued that the language needed to be called
108. 163 F.2d at 655.
109. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1) (Recommendations 1956).
110. U.C.C. § 2-316(a) (1949 Draft).
111. Id. § 2-316(2).
112. Id. § 2-316.
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to the buyer's attention."1 3 Making the language conspicuous is not
exactly the same as calling it to his attention, but it may be as close
as a general standard can come, particularly if the parties are not
dealing face to face.
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPT OF RELIANCE
UNDER THE U.C.C.
The concept of reliance is not dead under the U.C.C. in spite of
the efforts of the draftspeople to kill it. Ever since the enactment of
the Code, there have been courts which have read reliance back into
section 2-313.114 One of the reasons for the continued vitality of the
concept is that many people, including some influential commenta-
tors, believe that it is perfectly equitable and really does not signifi-
cantly affect the result. As White and Summers stated:
What the Code does to the pre-code reliance requirement is
quite unclear. One may argue that the exchange of the "basis of
the bargain" language for the old "reliance" language will not
change the outcome in any cases. (Indeed, we can point to none
where we are sure the outcome has been changed.) Others ap-
parently believe that the Code dilutes and perhaps even emascu-
lates the pre-Code reliance requirement. We favor the former
interpretation. Why should one who has not relied on the seller's
statement have the right to sue?1 15
One can answer White and Summers's final rhetorical question with
113. 163 F.2d at 656.
114. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir.
1983) (absence of reliance will negate existence of express warranty); Overstreet v. Norden
Laboratories, 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982) (warranty is basis of the bargain if there is reli-
ance); Royal Business Machines, Inc., v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980) (basis of
the bargain requirement is essentially a reliance requirement); Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974) (evidence of reliance used to overturn directed verdict for manufac-
turer); Speed Fastners, Inc., v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967) (where employer did
not rely on advertised product-safety claims, employee was not entitled to recovery for per-
sonal injuries); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972) (plain-
tiff has the burden of showing that he relied on seller's representations); Thursby v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (jury instructions on express warranty
were properly excluded where there was no evidence of reliance); Escambia Chemical Corp.
v. Industrial Marine Supply Co., 223 So. 2d 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), remand, 238 So.
2d 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (summary judgment was error where there was conflicting
evidence on the issue of buyer's reliance); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill. App. 3d
530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976) (seller's representation that a trailer was "new" and buyer's
reliance thereon created an express warranty); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 217, 490 P.2d
475 (1971) (where renters did not rely on statement that car was in good condition, defendant
not liable for death of passenger when tire blew out); Fletcher v. Coffee County Farmers'
Coop., 618 S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (evidence of plaintiff's reliance on defendant
seller's expertise was sufficient to support jury verdict).
115. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 338-39.
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another question: Why should a seller be permitted to deny the
validity of statements he has made in a sale context, whether or not
the buyer has relied on them at the time of negotiation? To do so
surely does not promote commercial honesty.
On a less philosophical plane, White and Summers claim to
have found no case where the Code language has made a difference
in the holding. A sophisticated reasoner can always look at those
cases that have rejected the reliance analysis" 6 and claim that if
reliance had been applied, the case would have the same result. It is
a good deal easier to point to cases where the court's resort to reli-
ance has led to a bad result that the Code's language meant to
change.
In Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsome, an employee was injured by
an allegedly defective explosive-powered fastener purchased by his
employer.1 1 7 The employee claimed to be the beneficiary of a war-
ranty contained in a pamphlet issued by the manufacturer which
the employee had read."' The court held:
Oklahoma has the Uniform Commercial Code. It provides that
express warranties are created by an affirmation of fact or prom-
ise which becomes a part of the bargain and by a description of
the goods which is made a part of the bargain. The plaintiff did
not buy the studs. Nothing shows that the employer when
purchasing the studs relied on any statement in the pamphlet,
any promise, or any description of the product. Without regard
to the privity question, the proof fails to establish an express war-
ranty and submission of that issue to the jury is prejudicial and
reversible error.1 19
It would seem that the elimination of reliance in this case would
lead to a different result. Under the framework provided by the
Code:
[A]ffirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a
bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods;
hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in
order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather,
any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the
agreement requires affirmative proof.120
According to this formulation, once the buyer had shown the exist-
116. See Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 998 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973); Young &
Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 324, 521 P.2d 281, 291 (1974); Interco, Inc. v.
Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 261-62 (Mo. App. 1976).
117. 382 F.2d 395, 396 (10th Cir. 1967).
118. Id. at 397.
119. Id.
120. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3 (1978).
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ence of the statement during the bargaining process, the burden of
proof shifted to the seller to show why the statement was not a war-
ranty. It is hard to see how the introduction of reliance into the
opinion, which cast the burden back on the plaintiff, did not make a
difference.
In Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., the plaintiff had read de-
fendant's catalog which stated that: "Federal Specs: GGG-H-86
applies to the BH-123 Hammer."'' This was a standard of hard-
ness of the hammer head which the hammer in question failed to
meet. As a result, the head chipped while plaintiff was using it and
plaintiff lost vision in one eye.1 22 The court held that there was no
evidence that plaintiff relied on this statement, and could not benefit
from the standards imposed by the federal specifications.t 23 In fact,
it was highly unlikely that plaintiff, a mechanic, would have had the
slightest idea what that phrase meant. His use of the hammer was
normal and foreseeable, and probably would not have changed if he
had understood the specification.
Hagenbuch is a closer case than Speed Fastners, but the court's
use of the reliance doctrine does seem to have changed the result. If
the burden had been on the defendant to show not merely lack of
reliance, but a good reason why the language in the catalog descrip-
tion was not included in the bargain, it is possible that the trier of
fact would find that the defendant did not meet his burden. Plain-
tiff's use of the hammer was perfectly reasonable, and if the ham-
mer had conformed to defendant's description it would not have
chipped. The plaintiff in Hagenbuch did indeed recover on a theory
of strict liability in tort. The reliance doctrine, however, served to
reduce the plaintiff's recovery by an amount attributable to contrib-
utory negligence.' 24
In Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, the plaintiff responded to
an advertisement for 1970 model trailers placed by the defendant. 1
25
Defendant eventually sold the plaintiff a 1969 model trailer. The
court held that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that
he relied on defendant's representation as to the model year at the
actual time of purchase. 126 Under a U.C.C. analysis not requiring
121. 339 F. Supp. 676, 677 (D.N.H. 1972).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 680.
124. Id. at 685. Plaintiff's use of the hammer in his trade was reasonable. There was
evidence that plaintiff continued to use the hammer after it had chipped once, which the
court found to be contributory negligence.
125. 44 Ill. App. 3d 530, 531-32, 358 N.E.2d 382, 383 (1976).
126. Id. at 534, 358 N.E. 2d at 385. In Stamm, although plaintiff went to defendant's
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reliance the defendant would have the burden of showing the writ-
ten representation was not part of the bargain.
In Stang v. Hertz Corp., the decedent was killed when a tire on a
rental car blew out.12 7 The court held that there was no express
warranty since the defendant's agent made representations about
the tires after the rental contract was signed and no reliance was
possible.128 The opposite decision would have been reached if the
court had given weight to the U.C.C.'s non-reliance language and in
particular to comment 7 to section 2-313, allowing post-contract
assurances to be part of the bargain.
The above examples indicate that, contrary to the assertion of
White and Summers, there have been cases where abandoning the
reliance requirement would have made a significant difference. In
all these cases, the retention of the reliance test resulted in a finding
that no warranty existed. The reliance doctrine will nearly always
favor the defendant. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a
plaintiff could show that a representation was relied upon, but could
not show that it was part of the basis of the bargain. The converse,
however, is not true.
In Speed Fastners, Hagenbuch, and Stang, the results reached by
the court allowed the defendants to escape liability despite their
promises. 129 These cases are saved from creating gross injustice by
the application of strict tort liability (in Hagenbuch) and implied
warranty theory (in Speed Fastners).3 ° The retention of the reli-
ance doctrine has probably hastened the trend toward litigating
products liability suits as tort actions rather than U.C.C. actions,
especially when they involve personal injury."' Although this
premises in response to an ad for 1970 trailers, he signed a contract clearly indicating the
correct model year for the trailer delivered to him. 44 Il. App. 3d 530, 531-32, 358 N.E.2d
382, 383. He claimed that confusion on the premises at the time of the signature prevented
him from realizing the correct model year of the trailer, but there would appear to be a valid
issue of fact as to what defendant promised.
127. 83 N.M. 217, 218, 490 P.2d 475, 476 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 83 N.M. 730,
497 P.2d 732 (1972).
128. Id. at 219, 490 P.2d at 477.
129. In Speed Fastners it is not clear that plaintiff's injuries resulted from breach of any
promise made in defendant's brochure, but according to the court's analysis defendant would
not have been liable if they had. 382 F.2d at 399. In Hagenbuch despite evidence that plain-
tiff had received the tool catalog, the court found that he had not relied on the catalog de-
scription when he purchased the defective hammer. 339 F. Supp. at 680. In Stang despite
oral and written statements by the defendant that the rental vehicle's tires were good, the
court decided that the plaintiffs had not relied on the statements in agreeing to the rental. 83
N.M. at 218-19, 490 P.2d at 476-77.
130. Hagenbuch, 339 F. Supp. at 680; Speed Fastners, 382 F.2d at 398-99.
131. This trend may have found its origin in the pre-Code case of Seely v. White Motor
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trend has provided a forum for redress of these problems, it is very
doubtful that the authors of the U.C.C. intended this result. Llew-
ellyn was much concerned for the rights of consumers in products
liability suits, 132 and certainly did not intend for their rights to be
omitted from his major statutory creation.
The cases discussed so far in this section have all been consumer
cases. Reliance also has its problems in business cases. As seen in
the Alaska Pacific case, the concept of reliance defeated express
warranties because the court found that the crucial representations
were made after the technical point of contracting. The U.C.C.
now allows post-contract statements to be the basis of a warranty,
but as the Stang case demonstrates, courts continuing to employ the
reliance test often ignore this U.C.C. provision.
In most business situations it will be easier to demonstrate the
buyer's knowledge and understanding of the defendant's representa-
tion. The remaining question is whether the buyer's knowledge of
the subject was such as to merit his belief in the representations of
the seller. Two cases demonstrating this point are Royal Typewriter
Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp. 33 and Royal Business Machines,
Inc. v. Lorraine Corp. 134 These two cases both involved a complex
series of transactions relating to the introduction of a new line of
problematic copy machines by Royal. Both courts unnecessarily
complicated the issues by affirming the reliance requirement. The
court held in Lorraine:
While substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings
as to the making of those four affirmations of fact or promises,
the district court failed to make the further finding that they be-
came part of the basis of the bargain. While Royal may have
made such affirmations to Booher, the question of his knowledge
or reliance is another matter.
This case is complicated by the fact that it involved a series of
sales transactions between the same parties over approximately
an 18-month period and concerned two different machines. The
situations of the parties, their knowledge and reliance, may be
expected to change in light of their experience during that time.
An affirmation of fact which the buyer from his experience
knows to be untrue cannot form a part of the basis of the bar-
Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 404 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965), holding that cases
involving personal injury are properly tried in strict liability in tort, whereas cases involving
economic loss should be tried in commercial or contract law.
132. See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society (pt. 1), 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699,
712 (1936); Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 408.
133. 719 F.2d 1092, 1101 (1lth Cir. 1983).
134. 633 F.2d 34, 44 (7th Cir. 1980).
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gain. Therefore, as to each purchase, Booher's expanding knowl-
edge of the capacities of the copying machines would have to be
considered in deciding whether Royal's representations were part
of the basis of the bargain.13 5
If the court had followed the Code's analysis, 136 Royal's repre-
sentations would have been considered part of the basis of the bar-
gain unless there was a finding to the contrary. The court's holding
does not even discuss who has the burden of proof on the issue, but
it would seem that since the court requires a finding of reliance, it is
the plaintiff who must meet the burden. It seems unlikely that this
confusion would have arisen without the concept of reliance.
The problem with reliance, as a standard, is that it is primarily a
subjective test. Sometimes there is objective evidence of reliance
when testimony or documents clearly indicate that the plaintiff was
looking for a particular feature and inquired about it specifically. In
many other instances, however, the only evidence is the plaintiff's
self-serving statement that he or she knew of the representation and
relied on it. The difficulty of proving reliance is demonstrated by
the examples already cited, and most often the courts use this diffi-
culty to deny the plaintiff part or all of his recovery.
Sometimes the courts have attempted to avoid this dilemma by
inventing a more objective standard: determining whether the
buyer was ignorant of the fact asserted by the seller, or whether he
had knowledge of the matter independent of the seller's representa-
tions.1 37 This test is often phrased in terms of the difference be-
tween assertions of fact and assertions of opinion by the seller.138 In
reality, however, it is still a reliance test, the underlying assumption
being that the buyer is not entitled to rely on the seller's opinion but
can rely on the seller's statement of fact.1 39 The knowledge stan-
135. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
136. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3 (1978).
137. Royal Typewriter, 719 F.2d at 1100 (seller held not to have made an express war-
ranty when he commented on the profitability of the machine; found to be an opinion and the
buyer could have also formed an opinion). Royal Business Machines, 633 F.2d at 41 (general
statements that the goods are the best do not create an express warranty); Thursby v. Reyn-
olds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (manufacturer of aluminum
cans did not make any affirmation of fact about which the buyer was ignorant prior to the
transaction); Keller v. Flynn, 346 Ill. App. 2d 499, 508, 105 N.E.2d 532, 536 (1952) (war-
ranty that hogs were free of cholera was found to be a warranty because the buyer had no
independent knowledge of hog's health); General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490
S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (seller created a warranty that greenhouse panels
would not deteriorate in five years, since buyer had no prior knowledge of the product).
138. See supra note 134.
139. White and Summers state that the reliance doctrine will remain an important part of
the "puffing" doctrine. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 339.
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dard is a regrettable judicial invention, since a buyer may often have
knowledge of a matter, but still be swayed by the seller's representa-
tions. As a test, it should be used to prevent the buyer from entrap-
ping the seller or to show that the buyer has failed to minimize his
damages. This, however, has not been the case.
The reliance standard is a failure in that it often promotes per-
jury or is impossible to prove. For example, in the pre-Code case of
Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., the plaintiff was injured by mascara
sold by defendant.14° The card to which the tube of mascara was
attached carried a written warranty. Plaintiff testified that after the
purchase the salesperson also gave certain assurances.14 The court
held that there was no evidence that the buyer had read the war-
ranty on the card or that it had influenced her decision to purchase
the product. 42 The court further stated that reliance could not rest
upon a representation made after the sale.143 The Beckett case may
simply be an example of error in submission of proof, but assuming
that plaintiff did not really remember reading the card, the tempta-
tion of perjury would be strong. On the other hand, only the plain-
tiff would ever know whether she had read the card, and a jury
might be hesitant to believe such self-serving testimony, even if true.
The response of the reliance supporters to this dilemma is that
the burden of proof has been shifted by the Code. White and Sum-
mers note that:
Comment 3 to 2-313 arguably means that any affirmation is
presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain and that the plain-
tiff need put in no evidence unless the defendant offers evidence
of the buyer's nonreliance .... We would so define the "pre-
sumption" here: even though plaintiff has not put on proof of
reliance, defendant's motion for a directed verdict will be
denied. 1
In fact, this view would not represent much of a change from the
reliance analysis under the Uniform Sales Act. As Professor Willis-
ton said of the Act:
There is danger of giving greater effect to the requirement of
reliance than it is entitled to. Doubtless the burden of proof is on
the buyer to establish this as one of the elements of his case. But
the warranty need not be the sole inducement to the buyer to
purchase the goods ... and as a general rule no evidence of reli-
140. 376 Ill. 470, 471, 34 N.E.2d 427, 428 (1941).
141. Id. at 472-74, 34 N.E.2d at 429.
142. Id. at 475, 34 N.E.2d at 430.
143. Id.
144. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 334-35.
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ance by the buyer is necessary other than that the seller's state-
ments were of a kind which naturally would induce the buyer to
purchase the goods and that he did purchase the goods.45
This was the opinion of an eminent authority from the earliest days
of the Act. It never stopped the courts, however, from using reli-
ance as a club with which to bludgeon the plaintiff. This same trend
is apparent despite the presense of the U.C.C.
On the other hand, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
will often put that party in the impossible position of disproving
reliance. In the Beckett, Speed Fastners, Hagenbuch, and other
cases involving brochures, catalogs, and advertising, the seller is in
no better position, if the burden is on him to prove nonreliance,
than he would be if reliance were abolished entirely.
From a moral standpoint, the evil of permitting an unrelying
plaintiff to recover on a warranty is balanced, if not outweighed, by
allowing a defendant to make a promise which he does not have to
fulfill. From a practical point of view, reliance is a difficult and
confusing issue to prove or disprove, and seems most often to be
used to prevent plaintiffs from recovering. Many modem courts
have ignored the Code's rejection of the reliance doctrine, and in-
stead have blindly followed pre-Code authority requiring reliance
and given relief, if any, in tort. The result has been to oust the Code
from its proper place in products liability law.
VI. MODERN AUTHORITY AND PROPOSED ANALYSIS
In an interesting article written in 1982,146 Dean John E. Mur-
ray, Jr., surveyed the most pertinent modem cases and commenta-
ries, and found that thirty years after the introduction of the U.C.C.
almost no one yet had grasped the meaning of the basis of the bar-
gain language, and that to a large extent reliance is still being incor-
porated into the language of section 2-313(1).147 His conclusion,
with which this Article heartily agrees, is that the U.C.C. has re-
jected the reliance concept in favor of a more modem approach
which looks at the entire scope of dealings between the parties and
does not focus on any particular moment of contracting or reli-
ance.148 He goes on to say, however, that he would focus on "the
145. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 206.
146. Murray, "Basis of the Bargain" Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 283 (1982).
147. Id. at 283-84.
148. Id. at 325.
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reasonable expectations of the buyer." '149
The test which the courts must use is a familiar test: what
are the reasonable expectations of the buyer? The reasonable ex-
pectations of the buyer are not relegated to those induced by the
seller's promise. Nor are they relegated to those expectations
which the buyer also relied upon in making the purchase.
Rather they are those expectations created by all of the "affirma-
tions of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bar-
gain." Since the duration of the bargain in Article 2 transcends
the classical concept of bargain, this test will protect those rea-
sonable expectations that a seller's statements create, regardless
of when those statements were made or when the buyer learned
of them. 150
Dean Murray's approach and underlying theory of the Code
agree entirely with the conclusions drawn here from the early drafts
of the Code. This Article, however, differs with his final conclusion
and test. Despite all of Dean Murray's disavowals, the reasonable
expectations of the buyer can turn out to be merely an expanded
version of the reliance test. How would the buyer develop an expec-
tation? The courts' answers are likely to be that the buyer develops
an expectation by hearing the seller's affirmations and believing or
relying on them. It is difficult to see how else an expectation is
created.
The reasonable expectations of the buyer test is one that may
fall on sympathetic ears in these days of consumer protectionism,
but it is not a test that finds voice anywhere in the Code. In fact,
comment 4 to section 2-313 tells the reader exactly what the test
should be: "[T]he whole purpose of the law of warranty is to deter-
mine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell . .. ."
This test varies in some important respects from Dean Murray's.
Focusing on what the seller has agreed to sell may sound like a
position empathizing with the seller, but in the long run it would
often benefit the buyer. The totality of what the seller has agreed to
sell is the basis of the warranty indicated by the historical analysis
of the Code. This analysis may be demonstrated by a discussion of
catalogue and brochure cases.
One of the most difficult problems to deal with under traditional
reliance analysis concerns products which fail to measure up to
standards in a catalog or brochure which the buyer and seller did
not specifically incorporate into their agreement, or which was ig-
149. Id. at 324-25.
150. Id. at 317-18.
151. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 (1978).
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nored by the buyer at the time of purchase. The Speed Fastners and
Hagenbuch cases, discussed above 152 present this problem.
In Speed Fastners, an employee was injured by a product
purchased by his employer.153 He claimed to be the beneficiary of
an express warranty contained in a pamphlet issued by the manu-
facturer which the employee had read.1 54 The court held that to
benefit from the express warranty the plaintiff had to show that the
employer had relied on the pamphlet when purchasing the prod-
uct.1 55 Dean Murray's piece and this Article agree that reliance
should be laid to rest, and that under the analysis indicated in the
Code the burden of proof should have been on the seller to show by
clear evidence that the warranties of the brochure were not given to
the employer. But what if the seller could show that the employer
knew nothing of the brochure? Should the employee be denied re-
lief? Under Dean Murray's analysis he arguably could, but the
seller's representations and the plaintiff's actions would be the same
in each case, and there is no reason for distinction.
In Hagenbuch, the plaintiff had read defendant's catalog which
contained an arcane set of federal standards before purchasing the
product.15 6 The court held that since there was no evidence that
plaintiff relied on the catalog description, he could not benefit from
the standards as an express warranty. 57 Under the Murray analy-
sis, it would be very hard to show that the buyer had any reasonable
expectation that the hammer would conform to an unintelligable
federal specification. Since the plaintiff's use of the hammer was
reasonable and would not have changed if he had known of the
federal standard, why should the result hinge upon the expectation
generated by it?.58
Focusing on what the seller has agreed to sell would yield a bet-
ter result in both the above cases. When a seller releases a brochure
either generally or selectively to those who may buy the products
discussed, it is hard to see why he has not agreed that his product
will live up to those standards. The seller should be compelled to
152. See supra text accompanying notes 117-32.
153. 382 F.2d 395, 396 (10th Cir. 1967).
154. Id. at 397.
155. Id.
156. 339 F. Supp. 676, 677 (D.N.H. 1972).
157. Id. at 680.
158. The court in fact found for the plaintiff on a related count of strict liability in tort
but reduced his recovery substantially under the New Hampshire comparative negligence
statute. It is unlikely that plaintiff's conduct would have been a ground for the reduction
under part seven of article 2 if recovery had been allowed under § 2-313.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
show by clear evidence why that language should not be part of the
deal.
White and Summers, and other commentators, might object
that this analysis injects express warranty into an area that is best
left to the tort of misrepresentation or to implied warranty.'59 In
consumer cases, particularly where personal injury is involved, the
plaintiff may be protected in strict tort liability. In many other mer-
itorious cases, however, the necessity for proving intention or negli-
gence in misrepresentation actions and the possibility of disclaimer
in implied warranty actions will bar recovery.
There is supporting evidence that strict liability for seller's rep-
resentations is the intent of the Code. Comment 3 to section 2-313
reads: "In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the de-
scription of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such state-
ments need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the
agreement."' 6 ° What is the significance of calling such affirmations
descriptions? It is that under the Uniform Sales Act, description
was an implied warranty and the buyer had to show neither knowl-
edge nor reliance.16 t Llewellyn regarded description as creating a
warranty that the parties could not avoid even by mutual consent:
"Section 14, then, requiring minimum flat compliance with descrip-
tion, stands, it is submitted, as distinguished from 'merchantability'
and 'fitness for particular purpose' and 'express warranty,' in sense
and law-as an iron section."' 62 It is not conceivable that Llewellyn
intended that the U.C.C., his greatest statutory achievement, should
disregard one of his most firmly held views.
VII. CONCLUSION
The failure of judges and commentators to refer to early drafts
of the U.C.C. in their attempts to analyze its language is surprising.
Great caution must be used in interpreting previous drafts of any
statute, since in drawing conclusions from changes in language, one
must necessarily determine why those changes were made.163 These
159. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 338-39.
160. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3 (1978).
161. See REVISED UNIF. SALES ACT § 14 (Report and Second Draft 1941).
162. Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 387.
163. Section 1-102(3)(g) of the 1952 edition of the U.C.C. barred the use of prior drafts as
legislative history: "Prior drafts of text and comments may not be used to ascertain legisla-
tive intent." That prohibition, however, has been removed from the 1957 and later editions.
See E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (4th
ed. 1985).
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drafts, however, can give rare insight to the meaning of its language.
They may not constitute legislative history in its usual, accepted
sense, but when dealing with the Code, legislative history perhaps
has a broader meaning than is customarily given to it. The semi-
official status of the comments is proof of that.
One of the reasons that commentators have failed to resort to
this material may be that subconsciously the bench and bar are still
unwilling to let go of the concept of reliance. In the common law of
contract, the use of reliance to replace many of the ancient require-
ments remains something of an avant-garde concept. 164 The idea
that reliance has been tried and found wanting in the law of sales
may not be entirely welcome among its contract proponents.
Even among U.C.C. commentators, reliance has not died easily.
As White and Summers asked: "Why should one who has not re-
lied on the seller's statement have the right to sue? Such a plaintiff
is asking for greater protection than he would get under the war-
ranty of merchantability, far more than he bargained for. We
would send him to the implied warranties."' 65 To this there is a
three-fold response. First, implied warranties can be, and fre-
quently are, disclaimed. Remedies in implied warranty and negli-
gent or intentional misrepresentation will leave many meritorious
plaintiffs without recovery. Second, dispensing with reliance does
not mean imposing absolute liability on the seller for everything he
ever said. The express requirement of the U.C.C. that the language
be "part of the basis of the bargain" allows the seller to come in and
show exculpatory circumstances. Finally, why should a seller not
have to live up to his representations, even though the buyer may
not have understood them or paid much attention to them at the
time? As Llewellyn said: "'What we need in business is common
honesty of speech,' telling the truth about commodities and stand-
ing ready to make good one's assertions."'' 66
164. See, e:g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, 88 (1974); Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269. at 314-17 (1986).
165. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 339.
166. REVISED UNIF. SALES ACT § 37 comment (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
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